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Abstract

This paper considers two important questions about FDI determinants: 1)
what were the most important determinants that attracted FDI to developing
countries in the top 20 FDI host countries between the years over the past
three decades and 2) to evaluate whether FDI is more attracted to
investment incentives or to the country’s economic environment. Using a
panel data with fixed effects model, we conclude that a country’s economic
environment is more important for FDI and that tax and tariff incentives are
not significant factors for foreign investors when we control for
macroeconomic variables.
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I. Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed a significant increase in Foreign
Direction Investment (FDI) to developing countries, vis-à-vis developed countries,
which had the lead in the 1990s. According to UNCTAD, developing and
transition economies currently account for 50% of world FDI inflows, balancing
the share of developed economies as shown in Figure 1 below. Most of world
FDI is initiated from developed countries, who seek high profit rates in developing
host markets, low-cost labor abundance or new markets for their products.
Developing countries, on the other hand, have low domestic saving rates and are
set to benefit from increased employment, technological know-how and
productivity spillovers from developed countries, since FDI is long-term in nature
and utilizes a large share of its inputs from domestic factors of production.
Figure 1: FDI Inflows by Group of Economies, % of World Total, 1990-2017

Source: UNCTAD, FDI database
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Given the importance of FDI to developing countries, a very important
question arises: Why does FDI go where it goes? There are two popular
perspectives in this regard, where the first states that FDI is attracted to factor
endowments and flows to countries with natural resources, cheap labor and large
markets. The second suggests that countries that adopt more favorable
investment policies and offer attractive investment incentives are more likely to
draw FDI inflows.
Due to the mixed evidence from the literature regarding the location
decision of foreign investors, we decided to take a new approach and focus on
the top FDI-attracting developing countries over the past 27 years. We ranked
developing countries with the highest average FDI between 1990 and 2017 and
through a panel data model, we answer whether these countries focused on
investment policies or rather on making their macroeconomic environment more
attractive to foreign investors. These 20 countries alone account for 88% of total
FDI inflows to developing countries over the past 27 years.
The motivation of this study is to answer two important questions: 1) What
are the most important factors that affect investors’ decision to invest FDI in a
certain host country and 2) Do government investment policies (tax, customs,
investment laws, lowering corruption, political stability …etc.) matter to foreign
investors or are they attracted to larger host markets mainly and incentives serve
as the cherry on the cake?

6

By determining the most common factors that attracted FDI in these host
countries, other developing countries can follow the steps of their peers to
increase their respective shares of FDI as well.
We test the common hypothesis in the literature that FDI is attracted by
government investment policies, including investment incentives, in developing
countries and compare the effect of government policy determinants vis-à-vis the
economic environment determinants.
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. Chapter II
reviews the literature on the determinants of FDI, with a special focus on
research on developing countries. Chapter III describes the data and the
definitions of the explanatory variables. Chapter IV presents and discusses the
empirical results of the model. Finally, Chapter V concludes.
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II. Literature Review
There is an abundant body of studies examining the determinants of FDI.
Most of these empirical studies use country level cross sectional or panel data
models to test the effect of certain variables that may potentially have an effect
on FDI according to economic theory. Additionally, other studies use firm-level
data or survey data to get more micro-level results for a cetrian host country.
These variables include investment policies and incentives such as tax
rates, tariff rates, quality of infrastructure; and macroeconomic variables such as
GDP, trade openness and natural resources abundance.
Thus the first step in understanding how countries attract FDI is to review
the available literature on the different variables and their effect on FDI. Most of
the research papers focus on the developed countries which have the highest
FDI inflows. Developed countries differ a lot from developing countries in FDI
determinants. Therefore, we will focus mainly on developing countries in our
review of the literature, which is our main interest in this research study. Below is
a summary of the main findings in the seminal literature.
This section will be divided into two parts, the first will focus on the
literature on government investment policy indicators and the second part will
review the economic environment indicators.
II.A Government Investment Policies
A large number of governments implement investment incentives to try to
attract FDI to its economy and promote its investment policies, competing with
other countries with investment reforms. Incentives include lower tax rates, tax
8

holidays, lower tariff rates, new investment laws that favour foreign investors,
free zone areas, developing reliable infrastructure for investment, lower lending
interest rates, lowering corruption incidence, among others. These incentives
have become a first defence line by governments to appeal to foreign investors.
However, these incentives come at a cost, and in many countries have a
marginal effect on increasing FDI flows to the host country for other
macroeconomic reasons for example. Most of the empirical literature in the
coming section supports the notion that incentives do not have a major impact,
particularly if these host countries have other major problems on the political or
economic sides and incentives cannot compensate for them alone.
II.A.1 Tax Rate
The effect of taxes on investment decision is a much-studied phenomenon
in economics. However, the literature on taxes and FDI is in debate about the
direction and magnitude of this relationship. Most of these papers point out that
the effect of taxes on FDI can vary substantially by type of taxes, measurement
of FDI activity, and tax treatment in the host and parent countries. Another
important issue is that most multinational companies face a double taxation issue
between the host and the home countries. Most countries have different ways of
addressing this double taxation issue, which further complicates the study of the
effects of taxes on FDI.
Rationally, it is believed that higher taxes discourage investment
decisions. Most of these studies are based on a cross section of host countries
with varying tax rates. Hartman (1984, 1985) was the first to point out a way in
9

which certain types of FDI may surprisingly not be very sensitive to taxes.
Hartman tested mainly the relation between FDI as a ratio of GNP and domestic
tax policy in the United States of America (USA) between 1965 and 1979.
Hartman differentiated between two types of FDI, one that is financed from
retained earnings to expand current operations and one that is financed by
transferring of funds from abroad. He found that the former responded more to
the host country tax rate, whereas transfer FDI did not respond meaningfully to
host country tax rate. The key insight by Hartman is that earnings by an affiliate
in foreign country will ultimately be subject to parent and host country taxes
regardless of whether it is repatriated or reinvested in the foreign affiliate to
generate further earnings.
Similarly, Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), Loree and
Guisinger (1995), Kemsley (1998) and Billington (1999) all find a significant
negative relation. More recently, Hasset and Hubbard (2002) found a negative
relation with an elasticity between -0.5 - -1.0 using microeconomic data. De Mooji
and Ederveen (2003) studied the impact of company taxes on the company’s FDI
decision by calculating the elasticity of FDIs to tax rates through a meta-analysis
of 25 empirical studies. They found that the elasticity stands at -3.3. Desai, Foley
and Hines (2004b) focused on indirect taxes other than income taxes and their
effect on FDI by US multinational corporations and found that it has a very
significant effect on after tax return of these firms and thus their investment
decisions.
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Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang (2006) found that lower taxes
attract FDIs with an elasticity of -0.67 for 53 developing and developed countries
between 1984 and 2002. Klemm and Van Parys (2009) test the efficacy of tax
incentives by looking not only at tax rates, but also at tax holidays in 40 Latin
American and African countries between 1985 and 2004. They found that tax
incentives affect FDI in lower-income countries. Grubert (2012) used a different
approach, by looking at the tax differential between foreign and domestic tax
rates and FDI decision; he found that a change in a company’s effective foreign
tax rate has a large and statistically significant impact on its FDI decision with
elasticity of -0.436. Barrios et al. (2012) used panel data from 33 European
countries between the years 1999 to 2003 to examine the separate effects of
host and additional parent country taxation on the location decisions of
multinational firms. They found that both types of taxation have a negative impact
on the location of new foreign subsidiaries with an elasticity of -0.87.
On the other hand, Wheeler and Mody (1992) found an insignificant effect
of taxes on FDI for countries with good infrastructure and expanding domestic
market.
II.A.2 Tariff Rate
Over the past three decades at least, developing countries have made
massive progression in opening up their domestic markets to international trade
and lowering their tariff rates. A number of countries have also worked on their
non-tariff barriers, in an attempt to attract FDI that is focused on exporting to
nearby countries. In a study on impact of tariff structure on FDI in Pakistan
11

between 1973 and 2011, Pervez and Malik (2013) conclude that lower tariffs
attract FDI and that countries should use them as an incentive to promote FDI.
Similarly, Du, Harrison and Jefferson (2014) found that tariff reductions in
China increased FDI and enhanced productivity spillovers between 1998 and
2007 using a firm-level dataset of manufacturing companies in China. Banga
(2003) also found that lower tariffs attract FDI in a panel study on 15 developing
countries in Asia for the period 1980 to 2000.
On the other hand, there is an opposite argument in favour of high
protection, arguing that higher tariffs encourage foreign investment in the high
tariff-levying country by increasing the cost to export. Thus FDI in this case may
seek to operate locally in countries with higher tariff rates to mitigate the effect of
exporting their products to these high protection countries. This “tariff-jumping
FDI” has become an important incentive of inward FDI to many high-protection
host countries with large market sizes, where FDI is attracted to higher tariff rate
countries, and not the opposite. Belderbos (1997) investigated the effect of high
tariff rates on FDI and found that higher protection measures have led to
substantially higher investments in the manufacturing sectors in these countries.
Similarly, Blonigen et al. (2002) found a similar positive response from FDI to
high tariffs in the USA in the period of 1980-1990.
II.A.3 Quality of Infrastructure
Good infrastructure is essential for investment, and many countries invest
heavily in its infrastructure development to attract new investment, especially
FDI. Investors prefer a well-developed infrastructure that includes roads, ports
12

airports as well as technology and electricity to be able to operate their
investments. In their study on manufacturing investment decisions by US
multination firms in a panel of 42 countries for the period 1982-1988, Wheeler
and Mody (1992) found that quality of infrastructure is a significant determinant of
FDI using Business International’s (BI) country score for infrastructure quality,
which measures the quality of transport, communications and energy
infrastructure. Kumar (1994) and Loree and Guisinger (1995) also found a
positive effect of infrastructure on FDI.
Asiedu (2002) and Demirhan and Masca (2008) used the number of
telephone lines as their variable for infrastructure and found it to be positively
related and significant in their models on Sub-Saharan African countries and
developing counties, respectively. Addison and Heshmati (2003) found that
information and communication technology (ICT) increase FDI inflows to
developing countries. Nunes and Peschiera (2006) used public expenditure on
capital to acquire fixed capital assets, land, non-tangible assets, and nonfinancial non-military assets as an indicator for infrastructure quality and it had a
positive impact on FDI on their model.
Campos and Kinoshita (2008) also used the number of telephone lines per
1,000 people as a proxy for infrastructure development in their study on 25
transition economies, but the variable was not significant. Onyeiwu and Shrestha
(2004) and Morriset (2000) used the same indicator as well in their panel dataset
models and it was also not significant, which the latter asserted to the fact that it
does not reflect the quality and costs of the telecommunication.
13

Finally, Khadaroo and Seetanah (2009) analyzed the role of transport
infrastructure availability in attracting FDI, by using the length of paved roads per
square kilometer of area, in 33 African economies between 1984 and 2002 and
found it to be an important factor for FDI.
II.A.4 Corruption
Corruption can be a routine hurdle for investors especially in developing
countries. Despite a considerable number of theoretical and empirical studies,
there is still no agreement on the direction of the impact of corruption on firms’
investment decisions. Empirical analyses have not yet consistently confirmed the
negative relationship between corruption and FDI.
There are two lines of thought in the literature regarding the effect of
corruption on FDI, the “grabbing hand” corruption theory and the “helping hand”
corruption theory. The former states that there is a negative impact of corruption
on FDI due to the high costs of corruption, whereas the latter suggests a positive
effect as it facilitates bureaucratic and administrative approvals and speed up
investment timeline.
Kaufmann (1997) found that the costs of investing in a more corrupt host
country were shown to be as much as 20% higher than those of a less corrupt
one. Wei (2000) studied the effect of corruption on FDI flows in the early 1990s
from 14 developed countries to 45 host countries and found a significant and
negative effect on FDI. He used 3 different indicators for corruption, the Business
International (BI) corruption measure, the International Country Risk Group
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(ICRG) Corruption indicator and the Corruption Perception Index published by
Transparency International (TI).
Drabek and Payne (2001), tested if transparency had an effect on FDI by
creating a composite transparency index compiled from the ICRG rankings in five
areas: corruption, law and order, bureaucratic quality, contract viability and the
risk of government expropriation of private assets. Their results indicated that
FDI is negatively impacted by high levels of non-transparency.
Egger and Winner (2006) also find a negative relation between FDI and
corruption, but it is relevant only for FDI to non-OECD countries, and that the
effect of corruption has declined over the past decade, and that other
macroeconomic factors have become more important determinants of FDI. Habib
and Zurawicki (2002), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Busse and Hefeker (2007) and
Hakkala et al. (2008) all found similar results for both developed and developing
countries.
On the other hand, Wheeler and Mody (1992), Bjorvatn and Soreide
(2005) and Saha (2000) find that corruption in the host country will not
necessarily discourage FDI from foreign firms.
More recently, Barassi and Zhou (2014) analysed the effect of corruption
on multinational enterprises’ decision to invest in 52 developing and developed
host countries using a parametric and a non-parametric model between 1996
and 2003 based on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.
They found that corruption has a significant negative effect on FDI decisions by
firms in both models. Interestingly, their parametric study also found that a higher
15

level of corruption would deter FDI from taking place, however once a country is
selected as the host country for other determinants, a higher level of corruption
would not deter FDI.
We can conclude from the review of the literature on government
investment policies is that most research reviewed found a significant negative
relation between FDI and tax rates, even when different types of tax incentives
were used. However, the results on the tariff rates were inconclusive, where
some papers found evidence of negative effect of high protection whereas other
papers found evidence of the “tariff-jumping” FDI theory.
The quality of infrastructure, usually using the number of telephone lines
per 1,00 people, due to lack of data on infrastructure bases of countries, found a
positive relation to FDI inflows, with the exception of a few papers which found no
significant effect. The authors

stated that the insignificant effect could

be due

to the fact that number of telephone lines does not give any evidence on the
quality of infrastructure.
Finally, the reviewed mostly papers found a negative relation between FDI
and corruption, which confirms that high corruption increases the cost of
investment and rips investors of equal opportunities. However, a number of
models found that the helping-hand theory of corruption is applicable in some
developing countries, as discussed in the review above. The reviewed literature
on government investment policies is summarized in table 1 below.
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Table 1: Summary of Government Investment Policies on FDI in the Literature
Effect on FDI in Different Papers
Variable

Positive

Tax Rate

Tariff Rate

Quality of Infrastructure

Corruption

Belderbos (1997)
Blonigen et al. (2002)

Negative

Insignificant

Grubert and Mutti (1991)
Hines and Rice (1994)
Loree and Guisinger (1995)
Kemsley (1998)
Billington (1999)
Hasset and Hubbard (2002)
De Mooji and Ederveen (2003)
Foley and Hines (2004b)
Goodspeed et al. (2006)
Klemm and Van Parys (2009)
Barrios et al. (2012)
Pervez and Malik (2013)
Du, Harrison and Jefferson (2014)
Banga (2003)

Wheeler and Mody (1992)

Wheeler and Mody (1992)
Kumar (1994)
Loree and Guisinger (1995)
Asiedu (2002)
Demirhan and Masca (2008)
Addison and Heshmati (2003)
Nunes and Peschiera (2006)
Khadaroo and Seetanah (2009)

Campos and Kinoshita (2008)
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)
Morriset (2000)

Kaufmann (1997)
Wei (2000)
Drabek and Payne (2001)
Egger and Winner (2006)
Habib and Zurawicki (2002)
Javorcik and Wei (2009)
Busse and Hefeker (2007) Hakkala et al. (2008)
Barassi and Zhou (2014)
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Wheeler and Mody (1992)
Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005)
Saha (2000)

B. Economic Environment
Within the economic environment of host markets, the accepted
hypothesis is that FDI is mainly attracted to large markets with high growth and
natural resources as well as abundant labor. However, market size appears to be
the most important robust and positive determinant of FDI within this category, as
we will see in the following review.
II.B.1 Host Market Size and Growth
Market size and market growth are considered as the most important
determinants of FDI. Almost every study on FDI in developing countries has
found a positive relationship between economic growth and FDI. Larger markets
and population size in host countries present a higher demand potential and thus
attracts FDI for companies seeking horizontally or open new export markets. The
most significant and extensively referenced study that links market size to FDI
was by Dunning (1993), who was the first to classify FDI intro three types;
market-seeking, which aims to open new markets for its products, 2) resourceseeking, which aims to make-use of natural resources not easily or cheaply
accessible in home market and 3) efficiency-seeking, which aims to lower cost of
production by relocating to lower-cost markets to achieve economies of scale.
Wheeler and Moody (1992) and Billington (1999) also found a positive
relation between the two.

More recently, Chakrabarti (2001) used GDP per

capita as a proxy for a host country’s market size and found that it is the most
important factor in attracting FDI by using an Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) on
135 countries in 1994. Addison and Heshmati (2003) found GDP growth to be
18

positive and significant in their model on the importance of ICT and
democratization in developing countries between 1970 and 1990. Similarly, in a
panel data model on determinants of FDI in 29 developing countries between
1975 and 1999, Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) used the same variable and found
it to have a significant effect in both of their modes, the fixed effect and the
random effect models.
Artige and Nicolini (2005) state that market size as measured by GDP or
GDP per capita is the most robust FDI determinant. Demirhan and Masca (2008)
utilized the growth of per capita real GDP to control for market size and not GDP
in absolute terms that may only reflect population growth and found it has an
effect on FDI attraction.
II.B.2 Labor Supply and Cost
The availability of low-cost skilled labor is a very important for factor for
investment in developing countries. However, potential foreign investors should
also consider labor quality, as developing countries may have an abundance of
cheap unskilled labor, but this requires a lot of additional costs to train and
educate. Banga (2003) finds that the cost of labor estimated using real wages as
well as high skilled-labor, estimated by higher secondary enrollment rate and
labor productivity, are important factors in attracting FDI to developing countries
in his model of 15 developing countries between the years 1980 and 2000.
On the other hand, in their study on ASEAN countries over the period
1991 – 2009, Hoang and Bui (2015) found that low-cost labor does not attract
FDI to the region, whereas labor productivity was significant, which is as
19

important to investors. Wahid et al. (2009) used nominal wage rate as a proxy for
labor cost in their model on FDI determinants in 20 African countries found it to
be a significant negative factor affecting FDI. Demirhan and Masca (2008)
studied labor cost per worker in manufacturing industry and found it to be
insignificant in affecting FDI decisions in their cross-section analysis on
developing countries in the period studied.
II.B.3 Exchange Rate
One of the important macroeconomic variables in a country is the
movement of its exchange rate. Exchange rate depreciation has a negative effect
on the value of foreign assets invested in a country and on the profits to be
repatriated to the mother company in home country. The link between exchange
rate stability has been investigated in a number of studies in the literature,
whereas some studies focused on the level of exchange rate versus the USD on
FDI inflows.
The direction of the relationship depends on the whether the cost or the
income effect is stronger. The cost effect is when depreciation has a negative
effect on current account when the country is a net importer, whereas the income
effect is the increase in competitiveness that follows exchange rate depreciation
for export-oriented countries. The net effect depends on which effect is greater.
Thus we find mixed results in the literature regarding exchange rates.
Blonigen (1997) used real exchange rate in his model on Japanese
acquisitions in the USA to test the effect of exchange rate on foreign direct
investment, and found that a weaker dollar attracted Japanese FDI. Kiyota and
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Urata (2004) also found that the depreciation of the currency attracted FDI,
whereas the volatility of exchange rates discouraged FDI inflows.
II.B.4 Inflation
Inflation rate is considered an indicator for macroeconomic stability of a
country by investors. A low and stable inflation shows the commitment of the
government, through its Central bank policies, to achieve a stable environment in
which investors and consumers can make informed decisions and predict their
future costs and profits with confidence. Furthermore, low inflation preserves the
purchasing power of currencies and leads to lower interest rates in the economy.
Thus countries with low stable inflation have been associated with high FDI
inflows.
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) found that inflation is a negative significant
in both fixed and random effects models. Demirhan and Masca (2008) and
Asiedu (2013) also found a negative significant effect of inflation of FDI. Addison
and Heshmati (2003) used inflation rate and variance of inflation rate in their FDI
model and both were either insignificant or weakly significant in their two models.
Busse and Hefeker (2007) used the GDP deflator as a proxy for
macroeconomic stability and found no significant relationship between inflation
and FDI. Asiedu (2002) and Campos and Kinoshita (2003) also found no
significant relationship between inflation and FDI in their model.
II.B.5 Trade Openness
A country’s openness to trade, measured in the literature commonly as the
sum of imports and exports as a % of GDP, is a positive determinant of FDI in
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most of the studies on FDI in developing countries. This is due to the perception
that open economies encourage investors who target to export their production to
nearby countries or to easily and cheaply import their required inputs from
abroad. Another indicator of openness is the relative size of the export sector
relative to the country’s GDP as well as trade as a share of GDP.
Charkrabarti (2001) finds that openness to trade, measured by sum of
imports and exports to GDP, is one of the most important factors in attracting
FDI. Nunes and Peschiera (2006) also used the same indicator and it had a
positive significant impact on attracting FDI. Addison and Heshmati (2003) also
find that openness to trade has a positive impact on FDI flows. Asiedu (2002)
also found openness to be an important factor for FDI attraction in her model on
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) followed the
same methodology and found that openness is a very important determinant of
FDI flows to Africa.
II.B.6 Availability of Natural Resources
For Africa and the Gulf region specially, it is known that FDI is mainly
driven by natural resources abundance, called resource- or asset-seeking FDI.
This type of FDI seeks to invest abroad to acquire resources not available in the
home country, such as natural resources, mainly oil and coal, and raw materials
that would otherwise be expensive to import to home country.
In their panel model on 25 transition economies between 1990 and 1998,
Campos and Kinoshita (2003) found that natural resources abundance has a
significant and positive effect on FDI. Similarly, Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)
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found that natural resource availability is a significant factor in FDI attraction in
their study on FDI flows to Africa based on a panel dataset of 29 African
countries over the period 1975 and 1999.
In contrast, Asiedu (2013) tested the significance of natural resources on
attraction of FDI in 99 developing countries. She employed two different
measures of natural resources, share of fuel of total merchandise exports and oil
rent as a percent of GDP. She found that natural resources have a negative
effect on FDI. This is consistent with the “FDI-natural resources curse”, where
countries with abundant natural resources tend to grow slower than countries
with scarce natural resources (Sachs & Warner, 2001).
Similarly, Poelhekke and Ploeg (2010) found that natural resources boost
FDI in the resource sector but crowds out FDI in the non-resource sector, and
that the total FDI is less in resource rich countries due to the dominating effect on
the non-resource sector.
From the reviewed research on economic environment determinants, we
find that the most robust factor is the host market size and growth, which has a
significant positive relation in all papers reviewed. Following suit was the trade
openness of host countries, measured customarily as sum of imports and exports
as a % of GDP in most models, was the second most important factor for FDI.
Despite its importance for foreign investors in developing economies,
eexchange rate stability was not very commonly used in the literature, were only
a few papers included the exchange rate effect and found it to be negatively
related to FDI inflows.
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On the other hand, labor cost and inflation had mixed results, which were
either negative or insignificant in the research reviewed. Natural resources rent
was controversial, as some papers found a strong support for resource-seeking
FDI theories, whereas others found evidence of the “natural resources curse”
that is evident in some resource-rich developing countries. The results of the
reviewed papers are summarized in table 2 below.
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Table 2: Summary of Economic Environment on FDI in the Literature
Effect on FDI in Different Papers
Variable

Host Market size and growth

Positive

Exchange Rate

Inflation

Availability of Natural
Resources

Insignificant

Banga (2003)
Wahid et al. (2009)
Blonigen (1997)
Kiyota and Urata (2004)
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)
Demirhan and Masca (2008)
Asiedu (2013)

Hoang and Bui (2015)
Demirhan and Masca (2008)

Wheeler and Moody (1992)
Billington (1999)
Chakrabarti (2001)
Addison and Heshmati (2003)
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)
Artige and Nicolini (2005)
Demirhan and Masca (2008)

Labor Cost

Trade Openness

Negative

Charkrabarti (2001)
Nunes and Peschiera (2006)
Addison and Heshmati (2003)
Asiedu (2002)
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)
Campos and Kinoshita (2003)
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)

Asiedu (2013)
Poelhekke and Ploeg (2010)
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Addison and Heshmati (2003)
Busse and Hefeker (2007)
Asiedu (2002)
Campos and Kinoshita (2003)

II.C. Contribution of Study
After reviewing the extensive literature of FDI determinants, we find mixed
results of studies on different regions and over different time horizons. This study
contributes to the literature by concentrating on top 20 FDI-attracting developing
countries to provide a more comprehensive list of common determinants among
these countries that led to achieving the highest FDI inflows over the period 1990
to 2017 to test our research question of whether FDI is attracted to government
investment policies or to macroeconomic environment of host countries.
We also test new variables in our model not commonly tested in the
literature before; including access to credit, share of private consumption as well
as the size of the services sector. We also use the labor force participation rate
instead of the labor cost to test the significance of labor abundance, as will be
shown in Chapter III hereafter. Finally, our research also aims to give policy
implication insights to other developing countries to follow their peers to increase
their share of FDI as well.
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III. Data and Model Methodology
III.A Research Design
This study will be designed as a panel data model of the top 20 FDIattracting developing countries between the years 1990 and 2017. The top 20
host developing countries were chosen on the basis of highest average FDI
inflows in USD between the years 1990 and 2017, according to the World Bank
FDI inflow data. We focus on the first 20 countries to allow diversification in
regions but maintain some homogeneity between the countries included in the
model to arrive at objective consistent results that can be applied to all other
developing countries. Country FDI rankings are shown in table 1 in appendix.
To determine the factors that contributed to the highest inflows, the FDI as
a % of GDP of these countries will be tested against a number of indicators to
determine the most significant indicators through a panel data model over the
research’s time horizon.
III.B Variables Definition
The variables included in the model include government investment policy
factors and economic environment factors. It is worth noting that the choice of
some variables was constrained by data availability, as some variables are not
available or have a lot of missing values for developing countries. For example,
data on wages is not readily available for most developing countries, so it was
excluded from our model, even though it is one of the important variables in the
economic environment group. Also, the tax rate used in our model is the
corporate tax rate, whereas it is better to utilize a broader measure like total tax
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contribution for example, which was not available for most developing countries
as well.
As is standard in the literature, the dependent variable in our model is net
FDI inflows, which is measured as new investment inflows less disinvestment by
foreign investors, as a share of GDP. Explanatory variables within the
government investment policy group include tax rate, tariff rate, infrastructure
development, corruption Index, government stability and interest rate. The
economic environment group variables include real market growth, trade
openness, access to credit, inflation, availability of natural resources, exchange
rate stability, size of services sector, labor force and final consumption.
Furthermore, the first lag of the dependent variable was used as an explanatory
variable to account for the incremental nature of FDI and to correct for serial
autocorrelation in the model. The summary of variable definitions are shown in
table 2 in appendix and explained below.
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III.B.1. Government Investment Policy Variables Description
a. Tax Rate
The statutory corporate tax rate, sourced from KPMG corporate tax rates
database, was utilized to account for tax rates paid by corporates in host country.
Higher tax rates are expected to reduce investors’ profits and deter investments if
too high, thus the effect is expected to be negative on FDI inflows.
b. Tariff Rate
The average of effective tariff rates on all traded products is used to
account for trade protection. Normally, higher tariffs discourage export-seeking
FDI, but in some case, as discussed in the literature review, sometimes FDI is
tariff-jumping and goes to high tariff countries to have cheap access to these
markets instead of exporting at the high tariff rates. Thus the sign of the relation
can either be positive or negative depending on the type of FDI and the host
country.
c. Infrastructure Development
To account for infrastructure development, the number of subscriptions to
a mobile telephone service that provide access using cellular technology per 100
people was used as a proxy. The better the infrastructure of a country, the higher
potential it has to attract FDI which prefers developed markets in terms of
transportation and technology availability. Thus, the relationship is expected to
be positive.
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d. Access to Credit
Ease of access to banking credit is a major impediment in a number of
developing markets, that are underbanked and access to credit by foreign
investors is even more difficult and requires a large number of procedures and
approvals, which makes a lot of foreign investors rely on credit from mother
company or home country. Given the absence of data on credit to foreign
investors, we use domestic credit to the private sector as a % of GDP as a proxy
for access to credit in our model, and it is expected to have a positive impact on
FDI.
e. Corruption
Corruption distorts market efficiency and accountability and leads to
unequal opportunities for investors. However, it is a common phenomenon in
developing countries in varying degrees, and is to be expected by foreign
investors. We utilize here the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), computed
by the PRS Group, a measure of corruption within the political system, which is
an index that varies from zero to six, with higher values indicating lower
corruption.
III.B.2. Economic Environment Variables Description

a. Host Market Growth
High-growth economies are attractive to FDI that seeks to operate in large
markets with high demand and fast-growing investments. Furthermore,
economies that are growing quickly are known to implement sound economic
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policies, which further enhance FDI attraction. We utilize annual GDP growth at
market prices based on constant local currency. GDP growth is the single most
robust significant variable in explaining variation in FDI, thus it is expected to
have a positive sign.
b. Trade Openness
Almost all previous studies have found a positive relationship between
openness of an economy and FDI. We follow the literature and use exports of
goods and services as a share of GDP to account for the openness of the
economy.
c. Inflation
Most developing economies experience high inflation rates, which is
consistent with the high growth rates of these economies. However, high inflation
rates hurdle decision making and makes planning very difficult for investors who
cannot accurately forecast prices in the near future. Furthermore, it decreases
the value of currency and thus the value of investments in these economies.
Thus we expect that countries with high inflation rates to be less attractive to FDI.
We use the first lag of annual inflation, measured as the change in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), in our model as we found evidence from diagnostic tests that
inflation has a lagged effect.
d. Availability of Natural Resources
Resource-rich nations are usually a target for FDI, especially resourceseeking FDI as we discussed before, which take advantage of the abundant
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resources of oil and natural gas mainly and usually flow to these sectors. We
account for availability of natural through the total natural resources rent as a %
of GDP, which includes oil, natural gas, coal and mineral rents. In our model, we
expect availability of natural resources to be a positive factor in attracting FDI to
developing countries.
e. Exchange Rate Stability
A constant change in exchange rates signals to investors policy instability
and may lead to huge losses when repatriating their profits to mother company or
home country in USD. Thus exchange rate stability is a very important factor for
foreign investors. We account for stability as the annual change in the average
exchange rate of the local currency versus the USD, and expect a negative
relation between this change and FDI inflows.
f. Size of Services Sector
The share of services sector has been gaining momentum over other
sectors in the economy, especially in developing countries. A lot of FDI has been
diverted from the traditional manufacturing sector to the services sector, thus we
incorporate the share of the services sector as a % of GDP in our model to
capture this effect and expect a positive relation.
g. Labor Force
The availability and quality of labor force is very important for FDI, as most
investments will have to rely on domestic labor, even if they bring a portion of
their required labor from home country to ensure quality. We account for
availability of labor through the labor force participation rate, which includes the
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proportion of population ages 15 to 64 that is either working or actively seeking
work.
h. Private Consumption
Private consumption is the main driver of GDP growth in developing
countries and offers a large market for foreign investors to market their products
due to the persistent gap between supply and demand in these markets. We
include household final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP and expect it to
have a positive impact on FDI in developing countries.
III.C Data Sources
The data were obtained from various sources. The main indicators are
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The
macroeconomic data were sourced from the IMF World Economic Outlook
(WEO) and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, corruption
indexes were sourced from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
researchers’ database and from Transparency International (TI), whereas
corporate tax rates were sourced from KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Database.
III.D Methodology
Having discussed the factors affecting FDI in developing markets and after
defining our variables and the time horizon, we now estimate our model for FDI
determinants. We follow the literature in modelling FDI determinants, where
commonly a measure of FDI is regressed on a number of variables identified as
determinants of FDI. In the baseline panel data model, FDI will be regressed on
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two groups of variables, a set of government investment policies and a set of
economic environment factors, as follows:
Yit = α + λXit +Ɛit ,
Ɛit = ŋi + γt + Uit
where Yit is the dependent variable which is measured as FDI as a share
of GDP in country i at year t. Xit are the explanatory variables divided between (1)
government investment policy factors (tax rate, tariff rate, infrastructure, access
to credit and corruption) and 2) economic environment factors (GDP growth,
private consumption, openness to trade, services as a share of GDP, natural
resource abundance, inflation and exchange rate stability). ŋi represents
unobservable country-specific characteristics and γt represents time-specific
effects. The model is estimated using E-views software, where the dataset is
unbalanced due to some missing data points but all countries in the dataset are
observed every period.
III.E Specification Tests
We started by inspecting the data for outliers for each variable within each
country separately. The data had very few outliers within each country; however
there are vast differences in the value of variable across countries, which will be
taken into account by using the fixed effect model. The descriptive statistics of
the variables are also reported in table 3 in appendix.
A pooled OLS model was then estimated as a starting step, which does
not account for unobservable country or period-specific effects, shown in table 3

34

below. In our case, the pooled OLS is less appropriate as we need to account for
these effects in our model due to the vast difference in sizes and economic
characteristic of some countries.
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Table 3: Pooled OLS Model Output
Variable

Coefficient

C

-14.812***
(0.000)

FDI/GDP*100 (-1)

0.512***
(0.000)

Corporate Tax Rate

-0.025
(0.468)

Tariff Rate

0.035
(0.319)

Mobile Cellular Sub

0.003
(0.360)

Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100

0.002
(0.660)

ICRG Corruption

0.267
(0.233)

GDP Growth

0.206***

HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100

0.078***

Exports of Goods and Services/GDP*100

0.041***

Services/GDP*100

0.135***

Natural Resources Rents

0.089***

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Labor Force Participation

0.017
(0.412)

Inflation (-1)

-0.003
(0.829)

Log Exchange Rate

0.021
(0.754)

Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Prob (F-statistic)
Periods included
Cross-sections included
Total panel observations
Akaike info criterion

0.839
141.892
0.000
27
20
379
4.932

P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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To choose between the fixed and random effects specifications, the
Hausman test was utilized to choose between the fixed effect model and random
effect model. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the preferred model
is random effects whereas the alternate hypothesis is that the model is a fixed
effects model. The test results shown in table 4 below show that the p-value is
less than 0.01, thus we reject the null hypothesis and thus the fixed effect model
should be used in this case. Hence, the pooled OLS is rejected in favour of a
fixed-effects model incorporating country-specific effects.
Table 4: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Ho: The preferred model is random effects
Ha: The model is a fixed effects model
Test Summary
Cross-section random

Chi-Sq. Statistic

Chi-Sq. d.f.

Prob.

36.394

14

0.0009

To correct for autocorrelation, the first lag of the dependent variable was
added to the model and the results of the Durbin-Watson test now indicate no
autocorrelation between the residuals, as shown in model output below.
The last step was to check for multicollinearity between the independent
variables through the correlation matrix, which is reported in table 4 in appendix.
The results do not show any significant correlation between variables above 0.6,
with the exception of a slightly high correlation between exports of goods and
services as a % of GDP and FDI as a % of GDP, which stood at 0.78 and is not
alarming and can be ignored in our opinion.
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IV. Empirical Results and Discussion
IV.A. Baseline Panel Data Results
Our baseline model estimation results show that mobile cellular
subscriptions, real GDP growth, household consumption as a % of GDP, exports
of goods and services as a % of GDP, natural resources rent as a % of GDP,
services as a % of GDP and as well as the first lag of FDI as a share of GDP
have a significant effect on FDI. As a group, these factors account for around
85% of the variation in FDI as a share of GDP, as shown in the following output
table 5 below.
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Table 5: Baseline Panel Data Model Output with Fixed Effects
Variable

Coefficient

C

-18.170***
(0.032)
0.357***
(0.000)
-0.021
(0.668)
0.058
(0.238)
0.018*
(0.069)
0.017
(0.160)
-0.223
(0.532)
0.171***
(0.004)
0.125*
(0.055)
0.057***
(0.001)
0.142*
(0.074)
0.186**
(0.015)
0.010
(0.891)
-0.017
(0.379)
-0.205
(0.704)

FDI/GDP*100 (-1)
Corporate Tax Rate
Tariff Rate
Mobile Cellular Sub
Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100
ICRG Corruption
GDP Growth
HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100
Exports of Goods and Services/GDP*100
Services/GDP*100
Natural Resources Rents
Labor Force Participation
Inflation (-1)
Log Exchange Rate

Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Prob (F-statistic)
Periods included
Cross-sections included
Total panel observations
Akaike info criterion

0.848
36.727
0.000
27
20
379
4.981

P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In line with the main conclusion in the literature, we found a very strong
significant positive effect of GDP growth on FDI inflows, implying that FDI is
attracted to countries that are growing at a faster pace. The coefficient of GDP
growth is 0.17, showing that an increase of 1% in GDP increases FDI inflows as
a share of GDP by 17%. This confirms that FDI in developing markets is indeed
market-seeking and flows to high growth host markets. It is worth mentioning that
when we used per capita GDP as a proxy for market size, it did not have a
significant effect on FDI. The same result occurs when absolute GDP in USD is
used as a proxy for market size.
Household final consumption also has a positive role in attracting FDI,
augmenting the finding that investors seek high purchasing power in their
decision to invest and open new markets for their products, especially in
developing countries where population growth is high and there is always a gap
between supply and demand for consumer products.
Another important explanatory variable among the economic environment
factors is natural resources rent as a % of GDP. Natural resources has a positive
significant effect on attracting FDI in our model with a coefficient of 0.186,
suggesting a substantial increase in FDI for an increase in natural resources
rents. This suggests that resource-seeking FDI to take advantage of unutilized
resources is very evident in countries in our model, which we found common in
the review of the literature on developing countries as well. This type of FDI’s
main focus would be either exploiting the natural resources in host country or
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exporting it as raw material to home country for consumption or production input
of an otherwise scarce resource.
Closely related to natural resources and market size, is trade openness,
measured by exports of goods and services as a share of GDP, one of the most
significant explanatory variables in our model, in line with the literature. FDI is
attracted to countries that adopt more trade liberalization policies and encourage
exports and imports, which would serve market-seeking FDI that operates in a
low-cost host country and wants to export to nearby markets to take advantage
of proximity and access to large markets. Furthermore, the degree of trade
openness is likely to affect the international capital flows, as more liberalized
countries signal to investors that they can easily repatriate their capital and
profits easily without any restrictions, unlike countries with strong protection
measures that restrict trade. It can also be argued that FDI and trade relation is
bi-directional, where countries with higher FDI tend to have higher trade volumes,
thus attracting more FDI that aims to benefit from exporting to nearby markets.
Furthermore, services as a % of GDP has a strong positive effect on FDI,
which is in line with the substantial increase in investment in services sectors
over the past decade witnessed in developing countries. This is also consistent
with other studies that show that the boost in the services sector came on the
expense of the manufacturing sector in most countries and caused the structural
shift of FDI from the manufacturing sector to the services sector.
The insignificance of labor, inflation and exchange rate variables in our
model are striking, though they have the expected signs. Surprisingly, the labor
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force participation rate should be an important indicator on the supply of labor in
the host markets. This may be due to the fact that participation does not account
for quality of labor, which can be abundant but unskilled and require time and
cost to train and educate.
The lag of inflation and the change in exchange rate, accounting for
macroeconomic stability, were also not significant. This can be explained by the
fact that high economic growth is usually associated with higher inflation as well
as currency fluctuations and is a common factor in most developing countries,
and thus is not a main factor in the decision making of these investors.
As for investment policy factors, mobile cellular subscriptions rate, a proxy
for infrastructure development of the country, was the only significant explanatory
variable among the group with a positive coefficient of 0.018. This confirms that
infrastructure development plays an important role in FDI decisions by investors
as it reduce the additional costs associated with poor infrastructure regions and
enhances productivity, which would serve to attract sophisticated investments
that need a solid infrastructure and technological base to invest.
As expected, tax rates and tariff rates were insignificant in the model,
showing that FDI is not attracted by tax or tariff incentives in developing countries
if there are favorable factors like market size and openness to trade for example,
which is consistent with previous conclusions from the literature. Tax rate had the
expected negative sign, whereas tariff rate had a positive sign, suggesting that
tariff-jumping may be more dominant in developing countries in our model.
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Credit to the private sector does not also impact FDI in our model, which
might be due to the fact that foreign investors have access to credit from home
country and do not rely much on domestic credit from local banks, which comes
at higher interest rates most of the time.
The second surprise in our study is that corruption did not have a
significant effect on FDI inflows. However, this is in line with several studies in
the literature and shows that foreign investors might tolerate higher corruption in
developing countries if the macroeconomic environment of the country is
attractive enough.
Finally, the first lag of the dependent variable, FDI as a share of GDP is
very significant and has a strong effect on current FDI. This exhibits the nature of
FDI which are consistent over time and tend to be long term investments, unlike
portfolio flows for example, and countries with high FDI tend to attract more FDI
and vice versa, as it signals to foreign investors that conditions are favorable.
Furthermore, FDI has an agglomeration effect for investments in same industries
are usually located closely to benefit from spillovers and externalities as well as
benefit from know-how.

43

IV.B. Robustness Check
We estimated a second alternative model, Model 2, with different variables
for corruption, labor, inflation and exchange rate, to test the robustness of the
results of our baseline model. For the corruption, we use the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, instead of the
ICRG Corruption index utilized in the baseline model. For the labor indicator, we
use population growth rate to account for abundance of labor instead of labor
force participation, which was not significant in the first model. We also switched
the annual inflation rate with the GDP deflator and the change in exchange rate
with the level of the official exchange rate of the local currency versus the USD.
The comparison of the two models is shown in table 5 below.
The results of Model 2 show that the alternate variables for corruption,
labor, inflation and exchange rate are all still statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, the same variables from Model 1 remain the most important
determinants of FDI inflows, with the exception of services as a % of GDP which
has become insignificant, which confirms the robustness of the results of our
baseline model.

44

Table 6: Baseline Panel Data Model vs. Alternate Model
Variable

Model 1

Variable

C

-18.170***
(0.032)

C

-66.532
(0.480)

FDI/GDP*100 (-1)

0.340***

FDI/GDP*100 (-1)

0.357***
(0.000)

Corporate Tax Rate

-0.021

(0.000)
Corporate Tax Rate

(0.668)
Tariff Rate

0.058
0.018*

Tariff Rate

0.017

Mobile Cellular Sub

GDP Growth
HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100

-0.223
(0.532)
0.171***
(0.004)
0.125*

Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100

Services/GDP*100
Natural Resources Rents
Labor Force Participation
Inflation (-1)
Log Exchange Rate

Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Prob (F-statistic)
Periods included
Cross-sections included
Total panel observations
Durbin-Watson Statistic
Akaike info criterion

0.057***
(0.001)
0.142*
(0.074)
0.186**
(0.015)
0.010
(0.891)
-0.017
(0.379)
-0.205
(0.704)
0.848
36.727
0.000
27
20
379
2.013
4.981

P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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0.019
(0.145)

Corruption Perception Index

-0.012

GDP Growth

(0.248)
0.165***
(0.005)

HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100

0.135**

(0.055)
Exports of Goods and
Services/GDP*100

0.019*
(0.051)

(0.160)
ICRG Corruption

0.043
(0.372)

(0.069)
Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100

-0.017
(0.725)

(0.238)
Mobile Cellular Sub

Model 2

(0.032)
Exports of Goods and
Services/GDP*100
Services/GDP*100
Natural Resources Rents
Population Growth
GDP Deflator (-1)
Official Exchange Rate

Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Prob (F-statistic)
Periods included
Cross-sections included
Total panel observations
Durbin-Watson Statistic
Akaike info criterion

0.060***
(0.000)
0.109
(0.156)
0.176**
(0.023)
2.801
(0.595)
-0.020
(0.215)
0.000
(0.572)
0.849
37.026
0.000
27
20
379
1.999
4.974

From the above results, we can conclude that FDI is mainly attracted to
large host markets with high growth potential and good infrastructure. Also it is
clear that FDI favors open economies through which it can easily import and
export its products to nearby markets and that the services sector and natural
resources are usually the main targets of FDI in developing countries.
It is also obvious from our model that investment incentives weigh the
potential of their investment in a market with the costs, including taxes, tariffs and
higher corruption prevalence, and when the risk-adjusted returns are high
enough, they accept these risks.
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V. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to identify the principal determinants of
foreign direct investment on a cross country basis through a panel data model
with fixed effects. Using a large sample of the top 20-FDI attracting developing
countries, we find that macroeconomic variables in the host country, including
GDP growth, trade openness, availability of natural resources, private
consumption and the size of services sector are most significant in explaining
foreign direct investment flows, while variables such as tax rates, tariff rates and
corruption prevalence are not at all significant. These findings confirm that
foreign investors in developing markets primarily seek large markets with high
growth and open trade as well as good infrastructure, and are not attracted by
investment incentives alone.
As a policy recommendation to other developing countries, following the
steps of their successful peers, governments should focus on economic
environment and adopt the right macroeconomic policies that boost economic
growth and liberalize its trade policies to increase trade. Furthermore, developing
countries must invest in their infrastructure to create a conducive environment for
foreign investment.
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Appendix
Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable

Name

FDI/GDP*100

FDI (% of GDP)

FDI/GDP*100 (-1)

Lag of FDI (% of GDP)

Corporate Tax Rate

Corporate Tax Rate (%)

Tariff Rate

Tariff rate, applied, all products (%)

Mobile Cellular Sub

Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)

Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100

Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)

ICRG Corruption Index

ICRG Corruption Index

GDP Growth

Real GDP growth (annual %)

HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100

Households and NPISHs final consumption expenditure (% of
GDP)

Exports of Goods and
Services/GDP*100

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)

Natural Resources Rents

Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)

Services/GDP*100

Services, value added (% of GDP)

Labor Force Participation

Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 1564)

Inflation (-1)

First lag of Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)

Log Exchange Rate

Change in average annual official exchange rate (%)
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Table 2: Countries and Average FDI Rankings
Country Ranking

Average FDI Inflows 1990-2017 (USD)

China

112,422,526,099

Hong Kong SAR, China

67,754,026,404

Brazil

36,918,603,834

Singapore

28,806,506,116

Russian Federation

22,282,812,049

Mexico

20,649,140,059

India

16,023,647,326

Chile

9,664,973,905

Saudi Arabia

8,074,671,509

Turkey

7,366,321,429

Korea, Rep.

7,339,467,857

Indonesia

7,182,586,927

Argentina

7,092,097,188

Colombia

6,520,282,103

Vietnam

6,427,166,667

Malaysia

6,231,160,403

Kazakhstan*

6,012,543,700

Thailand

5,924,230,634

Israel

5,607,239,286

United Arab Emirates*

4,810,449,190

Peru

3,979,255,694

Egypt, Arab Rep.

3,374,098,214

Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
* Kazakhstan and United Arab Emirates were excluded from the model due to a large
number of missing values
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

Observations

FDI/GDP*100 (-1)

4.951

2.900

56.351

-2.757

6.967

379

FDI/GDP*100

4.886

2.917

56.351

-2.757

6.829

379

Corporate Tax Rate

27.685

29.000

49.220

15.000

6.631

379

Tariff Rate

8.657

8.090

42.610

0.000

6.149

379

Mobile Cellular Sub

76.830

80.152

249.763

0.088

55.953

379

Credit to Private
Sector/GDP*100

65.744

50.058

233.211

9.683

46.322

379

ICRG Corruption

2.693

2.500

4.500

1.000

0.872

379

GDP Growth

4.242

4.572

15.240

-13.127

3.656

379

HH Cons
Expenditure/GDP*100

58.344

61.412

88.124

26.026

11.224

379

Exports of Goods and
Services/GDP*100

50.275

30.250

231.195

6.598

52.474

379

Services/GDP*100

54.156

53.359

91.922

30.926

11.239

379

Natural Resources Rents

6.474

3.867

55.312

0.000

9.067

379

Labor Force Participation

63.048

62.297

83.278

29.600

8.910

379

Inflation (-1)

7.635

4.296

105.215

-15.808

13.548

379

Log Exchange Rate

3.269

2.049

10.031

-4.511

3.030

379
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix

FDI/GD
FDI/GD
P*100 (P*100
1)

Corpora
Tariff
te Tax
Rate
Rate

Mobile
Cellular
Sub

Credit to
Private
Sector/
GDP*10
0

GDP
Growth
ICRG
Corrupti
on

HH
Cons
Expendi
ture/GD
P*100

Exports
of
Natural Labor
Goods
Services
Resourc Force
and
/GDP*1
es
Particip
Services 00
Rents
ation
/GDP*1
00

Inflation
(-1)

FDI/GDP*100 (-1)

1.000

FDI/GDP*100

0.889

1.000

Corporate Tax Rate

-0.505

-0.508

1.000

Tariff Rate

-0.435

-0.430

0.595

1.000

Mobile Cellular Sub

0.463

0.478

-0.556

-0.560

1.000

Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100

0.573

0.576

-0.525

-0.347

0.481

1.000

ICRG Corruption

0.565

0.572

-0.409

-0.403

0.296

0.436

1.000

GDP Growth

0.060

-0.015

0.001

-0.039

-0.079

0.062

0.025

1.000

HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100

-0.135

-0.130

0.322

0.321

-0.258

-0.408

-0.181

-0.164

1.000

Exports of Goods and
Services/GDP*100

0.790

0.777

-0.522

-0.497

0.409

0.676

0.537

0.067

-0.424

1.000

Services/GDP*100

0.662

0.657

-0.291

-0.362

0.392

0.410

0.511

-0.209

0.085

0.507

1.000

Natural Resources Rents

-0.156

-0.162

-0.182

-0.054

0.078

-0.192

-0.196

0.033

-0.392

-0.108

-0.478

1.000

Labor Force Participation

0.067

0.077

-0.025

-0.023

0.097

0.280

-0.051

0.112

-0.188

0.158

-0.102

-0.155

1.000

Inflation (-1)

-0.193

-0.185

0.312

0.048

-0.255

-0.324

-0.110

0.005

0.284

-0.217

-0.109

-0.111

-0.229

1.000

Log Exchange Rate

-0.139

-0.136

-0.092

0.061

-0.027

0.069

-0.075

0.022

0.182

-0.144

-0.350

0.034

0.394

-0.175
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ge Rate

1.000
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